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1 INTRODUCTION 
Technology is becoming an integral part of routine 
and emergency management of bridges and dams. 
Remote instrumentation and structure management 
systems are providing data and insight that has pre-
viously been unfeasible. Automated systems can 
tirelessly monitor data feeds, rapidly perform com-
plex calculations and dispatch notifications on thou-
sands of structures simultaneously. As these tech-
nologies continue to develop and assimilate into the 
process of structure management, the question of 
whether they are being designed and integrated ef-
fectively should be asked. The human factor remains 
core to the effectiveness of a structure monitoring 
system, regardless of the sophistication of technolo-
gy employed in the system. This paper examines the 
experiences of another high-risk industry, nuclear 
power plants, which have experienced and addressed 
many of the human factor issues which may begin to 
affect bridge and dam safety groups as they incorpo-
rate advanced structure management systems into 
their processes. 
1.1 BridgeWatch and DamWatch 
USEngineering Solutions Corporation (USES) is a 
developer of software solutions that enable critical 
infrastructure owners, regulators, and asset managers 
to monitor, in real-time, their bridge, dam, levee, and 
other hydrologic infrastructure. BridgeWatch and 
DamWatch are the two USES software applications 
of particular relevance to this paper. They are patent-
ed web-based systems which allows operators, gen-
eral staff, emergency managers, and state safety per-
sonnel to store and retrieve data, monitor storm and 
seismic events, and quickly respond to potentially 
destructive events. 
The BridgeWatch and DamWatch systems gather 
real-time meteorological and hydrological data from 
sources such as the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA), National Weather 
Service (NWS), United States Geological Survey 
(USGS), and the NRCS Snow Telemetry (SNOTEL) 
system. They then compare meteorological data 
against established site-specific thresholds and alerts 
predetermined staff of anticipated spillway flows. 
Users are automatically alerted by cell phone texts 
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and emails. Upon notification, staff are dispatched as 
needed during or after an event to specific structures 
for which alerts were issued. The system also pro-
vides detailed ticketing and dynamic forms to allow 
users to record information on the condition of struc-
tures and initiate follow-up actions. 
BridgeWatch and DamWatch systems store thou-
sands of files of site-specific data such as as-built 
drawings, design data, O&M inspection reports, 
emergency action plans, breach inundation maps, 
plans of action, photos, and videos. Remote access 
to this data enables users to interact with on-site per-
sonnel and specialists in various offices. The system 
also features simulated alert notifications that can be 
used to perform realistic tabletop exercises with dam 
owners, first responders, and other users (Caldwell, 
et al., 2014). 
1.2 USDA NRCS 
USDA’s Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS) has partnered with USEngineering Solu-
tions Corporation (USES) to implement their Web-
based application DamWatch to monitor and store 
data for dams constructed with USDA assistance.  
Since 1948, USDA-NRCS has assisted project spon-
sors with construction of 11,900 dams in 47 states 
and Puerto Rico (Durgin, 2014), with financial and 
technical assistance from one of the following 
USDA Watershed Program authorizations: Public 
Law 78-534 (78th U.S. Congress (2nd session), 
1944), Public Law 83-566 (83rd U.S. Congress (2nd 
session), 1987), Pilot Watershed Program (83rd U.S. 
Congress (1st session), 1953), or the Resource Con-
servation and Development (RC&D) Program (87th 
U.S. Congress (2nd session), 1962). Watershed dams 
are located in all states except Alaska, Delaware, and 
Rhode Island. 
These watershed dams are federally assisted, but 
not owned by the Federal Government. They are lo-
cally owned and maintained by project sponsors. 
Sponsors are generally local conservation districts, 
special-use conservancy districts, or municipalities; 
and usually have easements on private lands to con-
struct, operate, and maintain the watershed dams. In 
most cases, sponsors have nontechnical personnel in 
charge of the operation and maintenance of the 
dams, and most of the project sponsors rely on 
NRCS for technical assistance. 
Typically, watershed dams are earthen embank-
ments ranging from 20 to 80 feet in height with 
earthen vegetated spillways and concrete or metal 
principal spillways (USDA NRCS, 2014). Many are 
located in remote areas. Most of the dams are de-
signed primarily for flood control, grade stabiliza-
tion, water supply, or recreation. Therefore, they typ-
ically do not store much water except for short 
periods following large storm events (Caldwell, et 
al., 2014). 
2 HUMAN FACTORS IN THE NUCLEAR 
INDUSTRY 
The contribution of human factors to adverse events 
has received considerable attention in high-risk in-
dustries such as aerospace, medical, nuclear and pe-
troleum industries. The nuclear industry in particular 
can provide insights for the bridge and dam safety 
industry. Due in part to the nature of their work, the 
nuclear industry has long incorporated technology as 
part of their management and safety procedures. The 
lessons learned by the nuclear industry over the past 
30 years can help other industries as they incorporate 
technology into their routine procedures. The Three-
Mile Island incident on March 28, 1979 was a cata-
lyst for human reliability analysis (HRA), as ob-
served by E. Hollnagel based on a notable increase 
in the number of HRA methods (Figure 1) 
(Hollnagel, 2005). 
 
Figure 1. Cumulated number of HRA methods according to 
year of publication (Hollnagel, 2005). 
 
Separately the author notes two trends in the 40 
years leading up to 2005: “a decrease in the number 
of accidents attributed to technological failures, 
among other things due to an actual increase in the 
reliability of technological systems”. And, at least 
partially related: “an increase in the number of acci-
dents attributed to human performance failures”. 
Similarly, a 2004 report by the Nuclear Energy 
Agency noted that 48% of events reported at nuclear 
installations could be attributed to failure in human 
actions, and this figure has increased with time. In 
the 1980s approximately 45% of events could be at-
tributed to failure in human actions, a figure which 
had increased to 55% by the 1990s (Committee on 
Nuclear Regulatory Activities (OECD NEA), 2004). 
This has led to an increased focus on considering 
human reliability as a core aspect of system design. 
Human factors are explicitly cited in International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance (Office of 
Nuclear Regulation, 2014): “Systematic 
consideration of human factors, including the 
human-machine interface shall be included at an 
early stage in the design process for a nuclear power 
plant and shall continue throughout the entire 
process…” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 
2012) and “Verification and validation of aspects of 
human factors shall be included at appropriate stages 
to confirm that the design adequately accommodates 
all necessary operator actions.” (International 
Atomic Energy Agency, 2010) amongst other 
examples. 
Research in the area of human factors and relia-
bility has identified a range of factors which should 
be considered in the design and operation of large 
systems. For this paper we have selected a few fac-
tors we feel are of particular relevance to the bridge 
and dam safety industry at this point in time. 
3 HUMAN FACTORS IN BRIDGE AND DAM 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
3.1 Organizational decisions 
When initiating considerable technology changes to 
practices in an organization, it is important to in-
clude personnel in the process. Organizational deci-
sions are a significant human factor which can ne-
gate other human factors such as training and 
interface design. In analyzing a number of nuclear 
installation event case studies, it was noted that most 
regulators failed to put sufficient emphasis on “man-
agement and organizational capability to handle the 
interaction between technology, economics, human 
factors and safety in a changing environment” and 
that, in the past, regulators did not pay as much at-
tention to “the impact of organizational changes on 
safety as they have on technical plant modifications” 
(Manna, 2007). 
An important organizational decision is to in-
volve general users in the early stages of the adop-
tion of a new structure management system. If this 
poorly handled there is a risk of apathy amongst per-
sonnel who do not feel informed or involved in the 
adoption of the new system, and in the worst case 
scenario lead to a refusal to adopt the changes. This 
will considerably diminish the value of introducing a 
new structure management system into the processes 
of an organization, and may prohibit any natural de-
velopment of the system’s role in the organization. 
Personnel can be engaged by involving key repre-
sentatives at consultation stages, providing training 
and inviting feedback and input on the structure 
management system’s role in the organization. 
One contributor to our research noted that in his 
organization, which oversees a large number of 
bridges and dams, the majority of personnel are not 
engineers. There is limited interest in the work of 
bridge and dam management as it can be seen as 
complex and intimidating. Offering tools which pro-
vide clear information and action steps would in-
volve personnel and increase awareness of bridge 
and dam safety issues. 
3.2 The human data source 
There are significant benefits to involving general 
staff and even local interest groups in the structure 
management processes. The human data source can 
considerably extend the impact and reach of struc-
ture management systems. Individuals who are of-
fered the tools to provide their input on issues at lo-
cal structures can acts as “eyes on the ground”. The 
effort of maintaining a minimum oversight on a 
large, distributed network can be shared amongst a 
far larger number of individuals, who may be inter-
acting with or in the vicinity of the structures on a 
regular basis in an unrelated capacity. However if 
their observations can be collected at regular inter-
vals it will provide another, extremely valuable, data 
source for early-warning of issues developing at 
structures. With well-designed prompts individuals 
of all levels can provide information on the condi-
tion of a structure which are difficult if not impossi-
ble to measure using instrumentation. 
Furthermore, during emergency events, general 
staff and local interest groups involved in structure 
management systems can provide an accurate first 
assessment to confirm or dispute the information 
provided by monitoring technologies. They can also 
provide general information on the current condition 
of local structures. This is extremely useful to struc-
ture management authorities as it reduces reaction 
time, multiple structures are receiving a screening 
stage assessment simultaneously. This can ensure the 
inspection and maintenance team are directed to the 
structures requiring their specialist skills in a prompt 
manner. Thus an organization’s limited high-skilled 
resources are used efficiently at the time they are 
most needed, and they are not exhausted or frustrat-
ed inspecting structures which are coping with the 
conditions or which have received false alerts. 
3.3 Design of procedures  
It is important that the actions to be carried out in an 
emergency have been agreed upon, clearly outlined 
and made readily available to the responsible people 
to ensure they can respond promptly and confidently 
during an emergency. High-risk industries have long 
placed a great influence on the existence and adher-
ence to procedures. Procedures provide objective 
guidance to personnel throughout all stages of opera-
tion and provide a common expectation. Without 
pre-planned procedures, operators would have to 
make important decisions with little time for detailed 
consideration during emergencies. They also reduce 
the mental burden placed on personnel during criti-
cal situations. Thus they are correctly considered an 
integral part of the management of large assets such 
as bridges and dams. However, as discussed by Yves 
Dien (Dien, 1998), rigid design and an over-reliance 
on procedures can create critical voids. 
Yves Dien published a study examining 100 full-
scale simulations carried out by Electricite de France 
(EDF) to examine how control room operators coped 
with emergency situations. The study found that op-
erators do deviate from the exact procedures out-
lined. These incidents of deviation were rare, and in 
the cases simulated they were of little consequence, 
but are noteworthy for a number of reasons. The de-
viations typically occurred due to procedures not 
strictly matching the situation. This misalignment 
highlights the crucial role of the human factor in the 
effective implementation of a management system.  
Operations personnel will occasionally encounter 
situations not explicitly covered by procedures, and 
will have to make decisions about how to adapt ex-
isting procedures to address the current issue or use 
their own knowledge to address it. More frequently 
personnel will encounter obstacles to their progress; 
equipment failures, communication and power out-
ages, unavailability of personnel, which they must 
circumvent to complete the procedures. Finally, the 
procedures themselves implicitly require a minimum 
level of knowledge of the individual carrying out the 
procedures. The minimum level of knowledge can 
affect the complexity of the procedure: a single step 
may need to detail all actions required to carry out 
the step, or if employees are knowledgeable the step 
could simply state the outcome required. As an ex-
ample, “close the door” assumes a certain amount of 
the operator, whereas outlining each step required to 
assess whether a door requires closing, how it should 
be closed, and whether it has been closed may be 
frustrating for the knowledgeable operator. Such a 
detailed outline increases the complexity and time-
demand of tasks. 
A study by Xu et al on computerized emergency 
operating procedures found that an individual’s 
training level had a significant effect on the “error 
rate, operation time and subjective workload of EOP 
operation” (Xu, et al., 2008). Educating staff not on-
ly in the implementation of prescribed procedures, 
but also the reasoning behind the steps in those pro-
cedures and the intended outcome will greatly en-
hance the ability of a system to cope with routine is-
sues and emergencies. Staff would also benefit from 
education on the nature of the issues in their industry 
in general, as a deeper understanding of the phenom-
ena will allow a more informed response during 
emergency situations which deviate from theoretical 
procedures. 
3.4 Interface 
An important aspect of bridge and dam management 
is the implementation of emergency action plans 
(EAP) or plans of action (POA) during events. The 
vigilance of an early-warning system, and the insight 
of monitoring equipment are of great value in notify-
ing personnel of the need to implement an EAP or 
POA. However, the system must provide the key in-
formation in an easy to digest manner to ensure users 
will take the appropriate action in accordance with 
procedures. Interface design has been identified as 
an important factor in ensuring nuclear plant opera-
tors interpret and use emergency operating proce-
dures effectively (Xu, et al., 2008). EAPs at many 
bridge and dam authorities remain generally paper-
based as their usage pre-dates computer technology 
or they have not been converted to an electronic file. 
Nuclear operators have been quick to adopt comput-
er-based documentation as computer systems are an 
integral part of the day-to-day operations of nuclear 
power plants. Bridge and dam managers have begun 
the switch to electronic storage of documentation as 
computer usage and aptitude has become prevalent 
in general society. 
As digitized emergency action plans or plans of 
action become part of bridge and dam management 
processes, it is important that the impact of interface 
design is given serious consideration. Computer in-
terfaces provide many more presentation options 
than the constrained format of paper-based docu-
ments. However simply digitizing a hard copy of 
procedures provides limited gains, and has been 
found to be inferior to having a graphical presenta-
tion (Niwa, et al., 1996). To truly be beneficial, it is 
important that computerized procedures are present-
ed such that the operator can consult and understand 
them without adding additional mental burden dur-
ing emergency situations. The prompts should also 
be designed such that subjectivity and the potential 
for mistakes or oversights are minimized. In examin-
ing operator interaction with emergency operations 
procedures during simulations Xu et al (Xu, et al., 
2008) found both task complexity and presentation 
style were significant factors in the error rates for 
skilled operators. Events in the bridge and dam in-
dustry may not be quite as time-critical as those in 
the nuclear industry, yet clear, understandable pro-
cedures are key to an effective response whether it is 
measured in seconds, minutes, hours or days. 
3.5 Training 
A further observation by Xu et al based on their 
study was that “training level can significantly influ-
ence error rate, operation time and subjective work-
load of EOP operation.” (Xu, et al., 2008). It is vital 
to provide users with initial training, and ideally on-
going refresher sessions, to gain the maximum bene-
fit from the adoption of a structure management sys-
tem. To confidently integrate the system into their 
routine and emergency processes, users need to un-
derstand the system’s intended role and how to in-
teract with the software. This enables the user to in-
corporate usage of the structure management system 
into their regular schedule in order to increase their 
productivity and the impact of their daily work. Fur-
thermore, it allows the user to confidently use the 
software in emergency situations while under con-
siderable stress and where rapid response times can 
be crucial. 
There are also tangential benefits of training ses-
sions which allow users to interact with the structure 
management system. It has been the experience of 
both USEngineering Solutions and NRCS that train-
ing sessions have provided opportunities for users to 
suggest additional applications for the BridgeWatch 
and DamWatch system within their organization, 
based on the user’s personal experience working in 
the field. Training sessions also offer the opportunity 
to run simulations such as table top exercises, where 
issues in the process chain can be identified before 
they occur during a real event. 
3.6 Digital library 
The opportunity to digitize large volumes of docu-
mentation has been found to provide significant im-
provements in the informed decision making of op-
erations staff. As a pilot project for the NRCS’s 
national DamWatch system, DamWatch system was 
implemented for the state of Oklahoma. This Dam-
Watch system was populated with over 30,000 files 
by NRCS Oklahoma staff, including as-built draw-
ings, emergency action plans and inspection reports. 
The NRCS offices in Oklahoma have observed a 
shift in behavior where personnel now consult 
DamWatch first when seeking documentation related 
to particular dams. A web-based, structure-centric 
management system removes issues with locating 
documents, loss or damage to documents, access 
outside of opening hours. This removes significant 
obstacles to information access, and encourages per-
sonnel to retrieve all available information when 
making operation decisions. Having EAPs accessible 
on the web also helps assure that users have access 
to the latest version of the document instead of hav-
ing to rely on each holder updating sections of the 
document. 
4 CASE STUDY: FLOODING IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA 
4.1 Event summary 
In October 2015 a significant precipitation event af-
fected South Carolina in the United States. Record-
breaking amounts of rain were recorded, with storm 
total rainfall amounts of 15-25 inches recorded in a 
number of areas and isolated maximum amounts in 
excess of 25 inches recorded over a period of ap-
proximately 120 hours (National Weather Service, 
Charleston, SC Weather Forecast Office, 2016). 
 
Figure 2. Storm total rainfall with NRCS watershed dam loca-
tions (Durgin & Caldwell, 2015). 
 
This event caused extensive damage, including 
the loss of 19 lives (Kirby, 2015) and the failure of 
36 dams (National Performance of Dams Program, 
2016). 
The USDA National Resource Conservation 
Service has 105 watershed dams in South Carolina, 
distributed mainly in the northern and north western 
corners of the state, as can be seen in Figure 2. This 
area did not experience the levels of precipitation 
reported in Columbia and Charlestown areas, but the 
watersheds of the NRCS dams did experience 
rainfall amounts ranging from 2.8 to 8.9 inches  
(Durgin & Caldwell, 2015). 
 
Figure 3. Location of alert notification dispatched by Dam-
Watch for NRCS dams. 
 
On October 4th 2015, DamWatch issued 29 alert 
notifications for structures in South Carolina 
(Figure 3). The National Weather Service’s 
NEXRAD service uses radar to produce 
precipitation data products. This data can be 
acquired as a gridded shapefile, with each cell 
representing the amount of precipitation in inches 
detected by a radar station over the corresponding 
geographic area. DamWatch continually polls and 
process this NEXRAD data in order to assess the 
amount of precipitation impacting on each 
monitored dam’s defined drainage basin. If the 
precipitation levels reported by NEXRAD exceed a 
dam’s defined thresholds an alert notification is 
issued. The NRCS uses a two stage warning protocol 
for DamWatch notifications. The first warning level 
is a rainfall alert. A rainfall alert is defined as the 
amount of rain deemed sufficient to fill the 
impounded reservoir from its normal pool level. A 
spillway flow alert is the second, more serious, 
warning level. It is issued when a precipitation 
volume is deemed to have had  potential to bring the 
impounded reservoir from a normal pool level to 
active flow on the auxiliary spillway. 
The 29 alert notifications issued by DamWatch 
were comprised of 11 rainfall alerts and 18 spillway 
flow alerts (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. DamWatch notifications issued on 4th October 2015 
in South Carolina. 
 
Rainfall 
Alert 
Spillway Flow 
Alert 
Total 11 18 
Low hazard dam 6 16 
Significant hazard dam 3 2 
High hazard dam 2 0 
Spillway was flowing 2 16 
Continued to monitor 2 11 
 
Field visits were carried out by NRCS personnel 
to close the alerts in DamWatch. Based on these 
field visits spillway flows were confirmed at 16 of 
the 18 dams which received spillway flow alerts. 
Eleven of these structures were given a “Monitor” 
status; the dams required at least one follow-up visit 
to monitor their condition post-event. Two of the 
eleven structures which received rainfall alerts were 
confirmed as having spillway flows. Both of these 
structures were given a “Monitor” status. All 
inspections bar one, due to inaccessibility, were 
carried out by October 6th 2015 (Durgin & Caldwell, 
2015). 
4.2 Learning points 
A number of the key lessons noted in the NRCS re-
port on the South Carolina flooding of October 1-4 
2015 (Durgin & Caldwell, 2015) are worth noting as 
they are real-world experiences in line with aspects 
of the discussion in this paper. 
4.2.1 Screening stage 
The report noted that it would have been valuable to 
have local project sponsors carry out a first pass to 
improve the prioritization of field visits. This would 
require some training and the creation of a protocol 
on the exact assessments these individuals should 
make, but there would be great benefits in dispatch-
ing inspection and maintenance teams more effec-
tively. 
4.2.2 Training 
During the event personnel responded well to the 
flooding but were under pressure to act quickly. This 
was the first experience of using DamWatch inten-
sively for a large portion of personnel and they did 
not feel as comfortable using the software as they 
would have liked. There was a general consensus 
that further training in the use of DamWatch would 
be beneficial in ensuring it is used effectively. 
4.2.3  Access to information 
Issues were encountered during the response to the 
South Carolina event when information on dam was 
not available on DamWatch or users had difficulty 
retrieving the information. This highlighted a need at 
an organizational level to continue the work which 
was carried out in the pilot implementation of 
DamWatch in Oklahoma. All documents available 
for NRCS dams would be of even greater value if it 
is digitized and made readily available to personnel 
via DamWatch.  Further training will increase the 
ability of users to confidently retrieve all available 
information from DamWatch. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that human interaction with and as part of 
a structure management system is crucial to the sys-
tem’s effectiveness. These lessons have been learnt 
in many high-risk industries, and are already being 
experienced by NRCS and other BridgeWatch and 
DamWatch clients as structure management systems 
become an integral part of routine and emergency 
processes. As part of the design stage and as an on-
going concern the human factor must be accounted 
for if a structure management system is to reach its 
full potential. 
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